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Introduction
Making sense of the debate on business process reengineering (BPR) is a
daunting task. One is confronted with a wide variety of contradictory
interpretations. Some see it as a break with Taylorism (Davenport and Short,
1990), others see it as a direct continuation of Taylorism (Tinaikar et al., 1995).
Chief proponents see it as something very different from continuous
improvement (Hammer and Champy, 1994, p. 49). Others refuse to see a sharp
distinction between BPR and continuous improvement (Winslow, 1996). On the
one hand we learn that BPR is a self-conscious American way of outsmarting
rather than imitating the Japanese (Grint, 1997, p. 45). On the other hand,
Japanese companies such as Toshiba (television production in the UK) appear
among best practice examples of BPR (Oram and Wellins, 1995). Some see a
clean slate approach as essential, others maintain that analyzing and modeling
existing processes is worthwhile as part of BPR (Jacobson et al., 1994). There
are also authors who treat BPR in the context of management fads, which
would basically mean that BPR means little at all.
Finally, the core BPR literature is not free from internal contradictions. 
The starting point in this paper for dealing with these differences and
inconsistencies is: accepting that BPR has more than one identity. In doing so,
the paper deconstructs BPR into four identities.
Identity one: BPR as management fad (BPR-F)
Management fads are the products of the management consultancy and
management literature industry. One would expect a management fad to be
launched as something new, to be promoted by gurus, to be mostly
inconsequential when applied and to be more a matter of presentation than of
content. BPR seems to qualify well as a management fad if one takes the pointer
from super-guru Peter Drucker who says on the cover of Reengineering the
Corporation: “Reengineering is new, and it has to be done.” Hammer and
Champy themselves take care of the criterion of predominant failure. They
estimate that 50-70 per cent of all BPR efforts fail (Hammer and Champy, 1994,
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p. 200). The lightweight character of the BPR notion shows in the ease with
which Hammer and Champy (1994) relabeled the redesign of the parts
acquisition process, performed at Ford under the TQM (total quality
management) label, as a core case of BPR. Thomas Davenport, one of the
reengineering pioneers, seems to have come to the conclusion that BPR has
developed into a fad. He stated: “As is always the case with any fad, there was a
kernel of truth in reengineering. Over time that truth got lost.” (quoted in
Mumford, 1996. p. 328).
Since BPR-F is relatively devoid of theory (Mumford and Hendricks, 1997),
this allows many to project their own interests and concerns into it (Scarbrough,
1996). BPR-F is a fad with a life cycle like any other. Judged from its exposure in
the trade press, BPR-F may be slightly over the hill (Mumford and Hendricks,
1997; Simon, 1996). 
Identity two: BPR as a neo-Taylorist movement (BPR-N)
Some of the ideas in BPR are relatively clear and straightforward. The most
salient feature is the aggressive managerial mindset that it entails. A famous
quote from Michael Hammer: “It’s basically taking an axe and a machine gun
to your existing organization” (Computerworld, 1994). There is a loud
argument for a clean-slate approach. Also clear is the idea of integrating
business processes across functional borders: the attack on “functional
silos”.
However, in terms of the classical debate on work processes, i.e. the debate
which focuses on the division of labor and on skill and control, BPR is a loose
concept. On the one hand, BPR seems to be an attack on Taylorism.
Purportedly “reengineering rejects the assumptions inherent in Adam
Smith’s industrial paradigm – the division of labor, economies of scale”
(Hammer and Champy, 1994, p. 49). Hammer and Champy (1994, p. 53) claim
that: “Instead of separating decision making from real work, decision
making becomes part of the work. Workers themselves now do that portion
of a job that, formerly, managers produced.” They say that work becomes
“more rewarding since people’s jobs have a greater component of growth and
learning” (Hammer and Champy, 1994, p. 69). Amplifying this point, we are
told that “Companies that have reengineered don’t want employees who can
follow rules; they want people who will make up their own rules” (Hammer
and Champy, 1994, p. 70).
On the other hand, a different picture emerges when we look into the
solutions that Hammer and Champy present. In this area we see an
unproblematic acceptance of Tayloristic solutions. Examples are the use of
knowledge-based information systems to replace “highly trained” specialists
with (teams of) “generalists” (Hammer and Champy, 1994, p. 38), “triage” (i.e.
splitting off difficult cases and assigning these to specialists) or in a
decentralized organization, using centralized computer controls.
Hammer and Champy do not acknowledge this internal contradiction or
paradox. This might be for reasons of marketing: the managerial masses
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probably do not wish to be burdened with complex questions. The contradiction
may also be resolved by labeling the concern for human resource management
a “veneer” (Willmott, 1995a) that is covering a Tayloristic reality. At least one
study came to the conclusion that: “Despite its stated departure from Taylorism,
its ends are the same as many previous fads – the development (and imposition)
of organizational control systems to secure compliance” (Blair et al., 1997, p. 20).
Another study consisting of a content analysis of 248 articles on BPR
concluded: “BPR is a purely top-down approach to restructuring organizations
in order to increase efficiency on the basis of technical design criteria. In this
sense the principles of BPR are no different from the principles of scientific
management espoused by Frederick Taylor in the early part of this century”,
(Tinaikar et al., 1995, p. 109).
Loh came to the following verdict:
The assumption is that re-engineering is done for one reason only and that is process redesign.
If this assumption is carried to its furthest, the ideal company would be staffed by nothing but
robots. Most self-styled re-engineering gurus have done nothing to contradict these
assumptions. Robots work productively; people will always cause problems. Re-engineering
has entered the business world more or less on the industrial engineering side of the
management science conflict. Carried to its extreme, it can be made to define every motion of
the work to be done. Re-engineering is certainly capable of setting up a very detailed work
process, completely ignoring the abilities of people as well as totally eliminating any vestige of
ingenuity on their part (Loh, 1995, p. 105).
Another possible way of dealing with the contradiction is to accept that BPR
might, albeit in some cases, indeed lead to outcomes that deviate from
Taylorism. In BPR as defined by Hammer and Champy, however, any
movement away from Taylorism is a by-product of the streamlining process,
not a condition for successful change. Since on the level of ideas, BPR deviates
from Taylorism, and further because incidental non-Tayloristic outcomes are
possible, it would be confusing to simply write off BPR as Tayloristic. Instead,
a more appropriate label would be neo-Taylorism. Neo-Tayloristic management
approaches have the following characteristics:
(1) a top-down streamlining of operations;
(2) unproblematic acceptance of typical Taylorist solutions;
(3) asserting that the outcome for workers is an upgraded work content.
BPR is not alone in the neo-Tayloristic category. Lean production exhibits the
same characteristics (see Pruijt, 1997, pp. 8-10).
BPR-F largely replaced TQM (total quality management) as a fad. If we
follow the thinking of Hammer and Champy (1994, p. 49) this is because
TQM/kaizen is incapable of delivering breakthroughs. Counter-arguments to
this claim are that companies like Toyota achieved dramatic results with
continuous improvement on a massive scale and that Hammer and
Champy themselves use relabeled TQM as an example of outstanding BPR
(Winslow, 1996). Winslow suspects that opportunistic motives lead some to
trumpet BPR over TQM: “Those people who seek to gain the most from new
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concepts often find ways to degrade what has been done before” (Winslow,
1996, p. 7).
However, a key difference between TQM and BPR-N is that TQM involves
giving some control to subordinates, while BPR does not. Managers who are
unhappy with the participative aspect of TQM are swinging to a more
authoritarian position while embracing BPR (Grint, 1997, p. 49). As an interesting
analysis in Wired concluded: “Corporate leaders tend to like Hammer’s approach
because they can get rid of the cumbersome, bureaucratic chain of command,
without ceding control. Instead of giving orders, they can ‘program’ the
corporation” (Kleiner, 1995). Thus, BPR-N helped BPR-F to the top.
Identity three: BPR as a euphemism for downsizing (BPR-D)
BPR has become inextricably linked to downsizing, getting known as “big
people reduction” (US) and “bastards planning redundancies” (UK). BPR-D has
its outright advocates, such as Lyle M. Spencer who wrote a book with the
unmistakable title Reengineering Human Resources: Achieving Radical
Increases in Service Quality – with 50 percent to 90 percent Cost and Head
Count Reductions. His definition of BPR: “Reengineering is ... creative
destruction – the breaking down of old ways to free resources for new and
higher uses ... reengineers are to bloated, inefficient organizations what flies are
to garbage: they break the mess down into clean elements, freeing underutilized
resources (primarily people and capital) to be recombined to create higher
value-added products and services” (Spencer, 1995, p. 33).
In interviews, Hammer and Champy have played innocent but in an
ambiguous way. They have said that reengineering was not downsizing, but if
downsizing was the result of reengineering this had to be accepted (Mumford,
1996; Mumford and Hendricks, 1997).
However, in the reengineering stories that Hammer and Champy present as
models in their Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for a Business
Revolution, there is a lot of downsizing. One of these stories deals with Bell
Atlantic’s reengineering of the process of linking customers with their chosen
long distance carriers. Step one is reengineering this into an integrated process
handled by case teams. These teams are to be driven by commitment. The next
step is replacing the case team with one caseworker, assisted by new
technology. The final step planned is to install technology that enables the
customers to do the work by themselves. Labor cost is expected to fall by 
93 percent (Hammer and Champy, 1994, pp. 195-7). The link between BPR-N
and BPR-D is more tight than Hammer and Champy would have it. Successfully
applied Taylorism makes workers exchangeable. Therefore, BPR-N helps 
BPR-D.
Identity four: BPR as a non-normative label for business process
oriented change efforts (BPR-P)
It may be tempting to think of BPR as the application of the ideas of the
reengineering gurus. This would imply that something could be BPR only
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when it was started under the label of BPR. However, this is not the case.
Business process oriented change efforts were going on before the term BPR
was coined. Of necessity, Hammer and Champy themselves substantiated their
ideas by picking up stories dating from times before the BPR label existed,
thereby engineering reengineering into history. They are quick to point out that
they did not invent BPR, at most they just discovered it (Hammer and Champy,
1994, p. 220). The other early BPR promoters also constructed their vision using
cases in which the actors did not think of themselves as applying BPR
(Davenport, 1993; Davenport and Short, 1990). 
This means that the BPR field remains open for contributors who, for
example, accept Hammer and Champy’s (1994, p. 32) definition (“the
fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve
dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance,
such as cost, quality, service and speed”) but who are not prepared to swallow
the neo-Tayloristic bias. After all, there is nothing inherently Tayloristic in
Hammer and Champy’s definition of BPR itself. Moreover, not all BPR gurus
display the same degree of neo-Taylorist bias as Hammer and Champy do. This
becomes clear when we apply the three criteria of neo-Taylorism (top-down
streamlining of operations, unproblematic acceptance of typical Taylorist
solutions, asserting that the outcome for workers is an upgraded work content)
to the work of Thomas Davenport (and co-authors).
The criterion of the top-down streamlining of operations seems to apply. For
example, Davenport sees his thinking as “new industrial engineering”
(Davenport and Short, 1990) and acknowledges its roots in Taylorism
(Davenport, 1993). However, Davenport does not unproblematically accept
typical Taylorist solutions. Neither does he assert that the outcome for workers
is an upgraded work content. He concedes that IT-enabled process innovation
supports both empowerment and control and states “We are not enthusiastic
about control-oriented cultures (we wouldn’t want to work in such
environments), but they are possible and sometimes necessary” (Davenport,
1993, p. 96).
In his view, the four most likely objectives of business process redesign are:
(1) cost reduction; 
(2) time reduction;
(3) output quality; or 
(4) “quality of worklife (QWL)/learning/empowerment”. 
Referring to the goal of QWL/learning/empowerment he remarks: “Of course, it
is rarely possible to optimize all objectives simultaneously, and in most forms,
the strongest pressures are to produce tangible benefits. Yet managers who
ignore this dimension risk failure of redesigned processes for organizational
and motivational factors” (Davenport and Short, 1990, pp. 14-5).
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Throughout Davenport’s work there are hints of organizational choice, such
as in the following statement: “ ... process innovation as we have defined it is by
no means a simple extension of Taylorism. The human contribution to work is
to be celebrated and optimized rather than eliminated. Innovative process
designs can leave room for creativity and worker autonomy” (Davenport, 1993,
p. 316). Although Davenport criticizes sociotechnical systems design, he
implicitly grants it a role in the future by suggesting that it can be improved:
“What process innovation can bring to sociotechnical work design is the
importance of radical improvement in results and the measurement and
improvement focus of process thinking” (Davenport, 1993, p. 317). Nevertheless,
Davenport’s approach does not redress the neo-Taylorist bias (BPR-N). The
Tayloristic side of the story is bolstered with concrete examples complete
with metrics. The non-Tayloristic side remains relatively vague and
underdeveloped.
But is it realistic to expect that many researchers and consultants will jump
to fill this gap? It is possible that BPR-F, because of its strong claim of
performance and its (weak) claim of quality of working life, will steal the
thunder of rival non-Taylorist approaches. This could motivate non-
Tayloristically minded consultants and researchers to hop on the bandwagon
while hoping to influence its course.
An example of this is a reinterpretation of the famous 1949 sociotechnical UK
mining case as BPR (Mumford and Beekman, 1995, pp. 36-42).
On the other hand, because of BPR-N, individuals who are highly critical of
Taylorism will not feel any attraction to BPR. Moreover, BPR-D makes workers
afraid of BPR. Apparently, a fitting metaphor in this respect is workers as
poultry. In the literature, a middle manager of a pharmaceutical company is
quoted as saying: “I’m like the turkey who survived Thanksgiving. It’s nice I
survived, but Christmas is coming” (Johansen and Swigart, 1994, p. x). Unlike
BPR-N, non-Tayloristic change is dependent on worker participation. One
researcher rhetorically asked: “Will the turkeys vote for Christmas?” (Willmott,
1995b). This means that one might be ill advised to launch a non-Tayloristic
change program under the label of BPR. And the implication is that non-
Tayloristic cases of BPR-P, while existing, are not very likely to be presented as
“BPR”.
This is a paradox: for a full appreciation of BPR-P, that is for gauging the full
range of organizational choice involved, one needs to look at work that does
not come under the label of BPR. Non-Tayloristic cases that can be viewed as
BPR-P exist, and can be found documented with achievements and pitfalls
(Pruijt, 1997).
The value of a full appreciation of BPR-P is twofold: it is necessary for
maintaining and improving the quality of working life, but it also gives access
to the options for increasing organizational adaptability and mobilization of
intelligence and knowledge. BPR-D and BPR-N may lead to improvements in
terms of cost and speed. However, in the areas of adaptability and mobilization
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of intelligence and knowledge, BPR-D and BPR-N are likely to have adverse
effects (Davenport and Prusak, 1998).
Some of the failures in BPR can be attributed to a neo-Tayloristic bias. A case
in point is United Parcel Service. It reengineered its delivery service, speeding
it up and increasing supervision. However: 
Soon, the UPS found that customers were not so much concerned about the promptness of
delivery at 10:30 am as they were about talking to the drivers about the customer services
available from UPS. By trying to chase the delivery schedule, UPS seemed to have lost its
major advertising asset viz., drivers, and ended up having poor labor relations in the bargain.
Since then, UPS has increased the number of drivers, given them more time for delivering
parcels to customers and reduced the supervision; delegating to drivers the ownership of work
(Arunachalam and Subrahmanian, 1995).
(In the 1997 UPS strike, working conditions were not an issue.)
The multiple identities get in one another’s way
As we have seen, BPR-N injects a Taylorist bias in BPR-P. This effect is self-
reinforcing: because of BPR-N, few non-Tayloristically minded researchers and
consultants feel compelled to contribute ideas to the BPR-P arena. BPR-D
causes fear, which in turn leads to low trust relations in the workplace. This
makes non-Tayloristic options in BPR-P less likely, and increases the
transaction costs in all forms of BPR-P. Since non-Tayloristic change is by
definition dependent on worker participation, starting non-Tayloristic change
projects under the label of “BPR” seems not advisable. This can explain why
non-Tayloristic cases in the BPR literature tend to be relabeled cases that
originally belonged to other traditions. But many non-Tayloristic BPR-P cases
will paradoxically remain outside of the BPR literature. 
BPR-N contributes to failures in BPR-P. Because of the ideological
influence of BPR-N on BPR-P, there is not more than a weak correction
mechanism. Therefore, frustration will turn against the BPR concept in
general.
BPR-N helped BPR-F to the top. BPR-F generates interest, but, like any
fashion, it will burn out. Meanwhile BPR-D, which is boosted by BPR-N, is
already de-legitimizing BPR-F. Nevertheless, the underlying issues – the
dilemmas of organizational choice in process change – will always be there, and
keep our field lively and interesting.
A few implications for future research can be drawn. It is important to make
a distinction between, on the one hand, change projects that live under the label
of BPR right from their inception, and on the other hand, cases that were
retrospectively labeled as BPR. 
From the discussion of the interplay between the multiple personalities one
can derive the following hypothesis: increasingly, change projects that are
started under the label of BPR will show a Taylorist bias. Attempting to test this
hypothesis would require careful observation at the shopfloor level. Changes in
job design must be assessed in terms of skill and control.
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